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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the development of Japanese competition policy in the 1990s.
While there are certain signs of Japan’s transition to more stringent competition policy
largely as the result of the Structural Impediment Initiative with the United States in
1989, they should not be understood only by their appearances. It is remarkable, on the
contrary, that the bargaining power of businesses toward public officials and politicians
appears to have grown in general, and that Fair Trade Commission remains vulnerable
to the pressure from all those parties.  2
1. Introduction
The development of Japanese competition policy has been one of the most popular
agendas in recent years in Japan. Obviously the most crucial turning-point was the
launch of the bilateral negotiation framework called “Structural Impediment Initiative”
(SII) in 1989. In that framework, the United States requested the substantial
reinforcement of Japanese competition policy so as to rectify the chronic trade
imbalance between the United States and Japan. Whether such a way is desirable or
not
1, there is no doubt that this external pressure put good spurs to Japanese competition
policy. Following the discussions in SII and subsequent “Framework Negotiations”,
several regulatory reforms were carried out and the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) has
dealt with more cases since 1989 than before. By the mid-1990s, accordingly, a
prestigious Japanese lawyer came to remark that ‘SII was successful in strengthening the
Antimonopoly law with a view to harmonizing competition laws ... the enforcement of
the Antimonopoly law increased rather remarkably as SII progressed’
2.
However, it might be misleading to discuss how much Japanese competition policy
has converged to its counterpart in the United States only by looking at the changes in
legal texts and enforcement level. After all, it merely represent the output of the policy-
making process, but not the policy-making process itself. Since the most distinguishing
feature of traditional Japanese competition policy in comparison with American and
                                                
1 With regard to this, see Ostry, S. (1993) ‘Beyond The Border: The New International Policy Arena’ in
Kantzenbach, E., Scharrer, H.E., and Waverman, L.(eds.), Competition Policy in an Interdependent
World Economy, pp.260-277
2 Matsushita, M. (1995) ‘Harmonization of Competition Laws Through Bilateral Trade Negotiations: The
Japanese Experience’ in OECD, Beyond the Uruguay Round, p.134  3
European models is ‘its immersion in overall industrial policy’, as Audretsch points
out
3, it may be more important to see how such a structure in the policy-making process
has changed during the 1990s, either by foreign pressure or by domestic change. On that
ground, this study addresses the question how much FTC has gained its independence
from the pressure of industry and of other pro-industry interests at other ministries, and
at the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). At least in the 1980s, FTC was quite vulnerable
to such “pro-industry pressure”, and what we examine here is how this has changed
during the 1990s.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the changes in legal
texts and enforcement level of Japanese competition policy in the first half of the 1990s.
Section 3 illuminates a number of negative elements in the development of Japanese
competition policy during the 1990s. We then investigate the relational structure of the
policy network of Japanese competition policy, focusing on the degree of independence/
vulnerability of FTC vis-à-vis other actors. This leads to some conclusions in the final
section.
2. Changes in legal texts and enforcement level of Japanese competition policy in
the 1990s
In the final report of SII, published in 1990, the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) suggested a number of requests about Japanese competition policy. They
included (1) the reinforcement of the penalty system so as to render it an effective
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sanction; (2) the promotion of criminal as well as civil trials for the remedy of anti-
competitive practices; (3) the clarification of the enforcement guidelines of FTC
regarding trade customs and keiretsu relations; (4) the revision of the provisions for
cartel exemption; and (5) the relaxation of the rules which seemed to be
disadvantageous to the entry of American businesses into the Japanese market, such as
those in the Unreasonable Representation and Unreasonable Premium Act. Although the
Japanese government was not legally responsible for those requests, it was virtually
bound to carry them out, because the US government set up subsequent meetings to
check their achievement.
Obviously, this created a strong ‘fair wind’ for Japanese competition policy. A
number of reforms were thus followed to strengthen the regulatory criteria of
competition policy. The first is to raise the administrative surcharge for cartels. In the
case of manufacturers, for example, the amount of the surcharge was increased from 2%
to 6% in terms of the ratio to the annual turnover of the offenders. Secondly, the upper
limit of the penalty charge for a corporate body (but not individual employees) was also
raised from 5 million yen to 100 million yen in relation to the misconduct of private
monopoly, unfair trade restraints, and substantial restraints of competition. Thirdly,
there was a large-scale revision of the exemption for resale price maintenance, and all
exemptions concerned with cosmetics and medicines were abandoned until April 1997.
Finally, attempts were made to abolish exemption cartels. Since 1990, there have no
longer been ‘depression cartels’ and ‘rationalization cartels’ provided by the Anti-
Monopoly Law (AML). There are also some authorized cartels based on other
legislation, but they are now rapidly being removed under the dominant atmosphere in  5
favor of deregulation in recent years. Consequently, only 12 remain working in early
1998, while there were 276 in 1989.
Besides those changes in legal texts, FTC seems to have become much more active in
its enforcement of competition policy. Firstly, the number of judgment cases and the
amount of administrative surcharge have jumped since 1990. Between 1990 and 1994,
the total number of judgment cases and the amount of administrative surcharges were
142 cases and 26.4 billion yen, compared to 44 cases and 2.1 billion yen, respectively,
between 1985 and 1989. Moreover, in 1991, FTC made a formal prosecution for the
first time in 17 years (the wrap case). It also made an effort to clarify the regulatory
criteria for implementation by publishing various guidelines, such as those regarding
vertical trade restraints, mergers, collusive tendering, and activities of trade associations,
as well as extending its helping hand for private legal claims for the damages caused by
anti-competitive practices, declaring that it would provide ‘its opinion and relevant
material on which its opinion is based as much as possible’
4 in its report presented in
May 1991.
Furthermore, there has been a significant development in the resources of FTC
during the 1990s, as indicated in Table 1. Whilst FTC staff increased by only 23 persons
between 1979 and 1988, 73 new people were hired between 1989 and 1996. More
strikingly, the number of staff in the Investigation Division almost doubled (i.e. from
129 to 236) during this last period.
                                                
4 FTC (1991) Dokusenkinshihou dai 25jou ni motozuku songaibaishoseikyusosho ni okeru songaigaku no
saiteihouhounado ni tsuite (About the measure for the calculation of the amount of damages on the
lawsuit for damages based on Article 25 of the Anti-Monopoly Law)  6
Table 1 The total number of FTC staff and of the staff in Investigation Division
of FTC: 1989-96
Year








1989 461 - 129 -
1990 474 +13      165 +36     
1991 478 +4      178 +13     
1992 484 +6      186 +8     
1993 493 +9      203 +17     
1994 506 +13      220 +17     
1995 520 +14      228 +8     
1996 534 +14      236 +8     
1989-96 - +73      - +107     
Source: calculated from the data of FTC
5
In 1994, FTC secured its own place in the neighborhood of such judicial
administrative bodies as the Minister of Justice and the Public Prosecutor’s Office
(PPO). This has given FTC an appearance of a part of the family of judicial bodies,
whereas it was formerly lodged at the buildings of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Economic Planning Agency, which made it look marginalized in the bureaucratic
society.
For the first time in its 40-year history, there was also a reform in the status of FTC
Secretariat in 1996. In the past, FTC Secretariat was composed of just one bureau, but
the 1996 reform redefined FTC as a General Bureau, and its two divisions (Economic
Trade Division and Investigation Division) were upgraded to Bureau status. Given the
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culture of Japanese bureaucracy for attaching importance to one’s title, the change from
‘Division’ to ‘Bureau’ may well increase the power of FTC staff, which ‘puts them on
an equal footing with other public officials’, as some senior FTC officials observed
6.
 From those changes, it might be natural to say that FTC became more powerful and
active by the mid-1990s. One foreign scholar went so far as to comment that ‘it is
plausible to suggest that a historic shift has taken place in favour of consumer-oriented
policies and effective implementation of the Antimonopoly Act’
7. At that time, many
expected the emergence of a “biting watchdog” in Japanese competition policy.
3. Some negative elements in the development of Japanese competition policy in the
1990s
When examined carefully, nonetheless, a number of elements can be found which make
us less confident of the advent of a “biting watchdog”. To begin with, certain negative
aspects should be pointed out in relation to the regulatory changes shown above. Firstly,
it is true that the 1991 reform raised the percentages for administrative surcharge, but
that was not the whole story. The reform also attached the condition that the
administrative surcharge should only cover the turnover of the past three years, no
matter how long cartels had been effective. Even though the percentage criteria were
raised, it is obvious that the new legislation has reduced the degree of punishment for
those who has retained their cartels for a long time. Secondly, it is also true that the
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upper limit of the penalty charge has increased from five million yen to one hundred
million yen, but that was the result of the compromise of FTC, which allegedly wanted
the upper limit to be ‘several hundred million yen’. Moreover, the reform failed to
satisfy both the director of the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice
8 and
the representative of USTR
9. Thirdly, whereas the large-scale reduction in the
exemptions for resale price maintenance should be appreciated rightly, we must
remember that there are still a number of exempted products including books,
magazines, newspapers, music tapes, and CDs. Finally, even though there is no doubt
that the exempted cartels were reduced significantly, that should be attributed not to the
effort of FTC, but primarily to the change in the attitude of other ministries which had
established the exemption rules on their own.
A number of questions can also be raised about the enforcement record of FTC. FTC
has four choices (apart from prosecution) to regulate cartels: administrative surcharge,
recommendation, warning, and attention. The first two are legal cases accompanied by
formal judgment, while the others are not. It is true that the share of legal cases has
increased since SII, but it is noteworthy that the total number of decisions, which once
jumped up at the time of the inauguration of SII in 1989, has gradually fallen since then
(Figure 1). It should also be remembered that the number of warning cases has fallen,
giving way to a less serious means of attention cases. It could, of course, be argued that
this only reflects the decrease in cartels in Japan, but there is no evidence of that.
With regard to prosecution cases, it is conceivably disappointing that only three cases
                                                
8 See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, April 15 1992
9 See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, April 28 1992  9
were added in six years after 1991. Those cases were often viewed either as the
‘gestures’ to satisfy US interests, or as ‘scapegoats’ for more serious problems. For
example, the 1991 case occurred just before the Follow-up meeting of SII, and the 1993
and 1995 cases coincided with the Framework negotiations and the bilateral meeting of
the US-Japan competition authorities. As for the 1997 case, furthermore, it is not
unlikely that FTC brought it just in order to demonstrate the effect of the organizational
reform. The target products - wrap, seal, electrical equipment for sewerage, and water
supply meter - were rather marginal, and FTC is often seen as bullying the weak while
leaving the strong untouched.
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Note: Legal cases here includes the direction for administrative surcharge and
‘recommendation’ cases, but not prosecution cases.
Source: calculated from the data of FTC
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Those records of the achievement and enforcement have led other public officials to
‘feel that FTC habitually avoids confronting difficult issues and only works on easy
ones to justify its own existence’
11. In addition, it is not very clear whether the
clarification of various regulatory criteria and the declaration of the assistance in private
actions has produced any significant change in the traditional pattern of business
practices, or in the enforcement level of competition policy.
Two significant amendments in AML have taken place in recent years: the removal
of the prohibition against the establishment of holding companies in 1997, and the
reduction in the scope of merger control in 1998. These amendments made AML look
more similar to its counterparts in many other developed countries, but it is questionable
whether they are economically justifiable or not. Apart from economic discussion, we
should remember that it was not FTC, but rather businesses and other ministries, notably
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Finance
(MoF), that required the amendments. With specific regard to the amendment on
holding companies, FTC starkly resisted it in the beginning
12, but it suddenly changed
its position in favor of businesses as the policy discussion went on. Whereas it might be
true that FTC was convinced that the prohibition was no longer economically
                                                
11 Ikuta (1995) Kanryo: Japan's hidden government, p.167
12 For example, Kazuyuki Funahashi, the Companies Section Chief stated in 1995 that ‘Recently, the issue
of holding companies has frequently been taken up, and in particular the media such as newspapers seem
to believe that the removal of the prohibition in the future has already been decided. ... However, FTC at
this moment is not very optimistic about it.’ See Funahashi, K. (1995) 'Mochikabukaisha Kinshi ha
Hitsuyo (The Prohibition of Holding Companies is Necessary)', Nihon Keizai Kenkyu Centre Kaiho, July
1995, pp.20-21  11
significant, it is also possible that FTC might have made a compromise on this issue
with LDP in order to get the party’s support for its organizational reform
13.
4. The policy network of Japanese competition policy
The existence of both positive and negative aspects in the development of Japanese
competition policy indicated above, suggests that it is difficult to assess it just by
observing the changes in legal texts and enforcement level. We will therefore investigate
how the structure of the policy-making process has transformed over time. To do that,
we introduce the “policy network” approach, whereby the policy-making process is
viewed as an interaction between those social actors (e.g. businesses), public officials,
and politicians with mutual relationships and dependencies
14.
Since there are various actors and numerous kinds of relationships in the policy
network of Japanese competition policy, it is useful to simplify the model by focusing
only on the “routes of pressure” of businesses toward FTC, as shown in Figure 2. Here
the “routes of pressure” denotes how one party persuades another party to its idea and
direction, whether they are originally in agreement or not. It is true that there may be
other “routes of pressures” (e.g. between “non-FTC” ministries and politicians) and
internal controversies within each party, but we ignore those aspects here in order to
keep things manageable.
                                                
13 For example, see Zaikei Shoho, 25 June 1996. The view was reconfirmed by several respondents in the
interviews with the author.
14 With respect to the policy network approach, see, for instance, Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997) Understanding  12











R1: between businesses and “non-FTC” officials
In general, Japanese businesses seem to have increased their bargaining power vis-à-vis
public officials in recent years. One reason for this is related to a mostly formalized
network between businesses and the government through retired public officials, which
is quite remarkable in Japan and is generally called the “descent from heaven” system.
Whereas the increase in the bargaining power of businesses may imply the growth of
this system, the fact is quite the opposite.
Previously, as Murofushi points out, businesses expected “descent from heaven”
officials to establish, or strengthen, the connections through which their interests were
reflected well in the government policies
15. Yet as the scope of state intervention
becomes smaller under the overall political atmosphere in favor of deregulation, the
attractiveness of such connections has greatly been reduced. As the result of the long-
standing recession during the 1990s, moreover, many businessmen today come to see
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15 See Murofushi, T. (1983) Kokyu Kanryo (High-Ranking Bureaucrats), pp.116-137  13
the system as too costly to keep. According to the research of Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
for example, over 80% of 300 middle-ranking businessmen in the largest Japanese
companies in 1994 answered that businesses should be more distant from the
government, whilst only 7% of them considered the ‘descent from heaven’ ‘necessary’
or ‘rather necessary’
16. In addition, strong public criticism has been occurring to the
collusive relationship between businesses and the government, and to unfairly good
salary conditions to the “descent from heaven” people. This has naturally made
businesses more reluctant to engage themselves in that system.
Under the current employment routine, however, the majority of high-ranking
officials are employed just after they graduate from the university and then retire very
early when they are filtered out from the competition in climbing to the top (i.e. the
position of the administrative vice-minister). This routine seems very difficult to
change, but without changing it, the government must rely on the companies which
accept, and are expected to keep accepting in the future, those early-retired officials.
Under those circumstances, one may conceive that the bargaining power of businesses
vis-à-vis public officials has been enhanced.
With regard to competition policy, it should also be noted that businesses may take
advantage of MITI’s coming to act for the sake of competition policy besides FTC in
recent years. Given the close connection between industrial policy and competition
policy, it may be natural for MITI to extend its authority to competition policy. The fact
that MITI, not FTC, played a principal role in SII and other international negotiations,
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may also explain MITI’s increasing concern with competition policy. Whereas MITI
previously treated competition policy as an obstacle to its industrial policy, the ministry
now seems to think that it is better to accommodate competition policy in the scope of
its own policy. It is true that MITI would no longer be willing to advocate clearly anti-
competitive policies even for the sake of businesses, but businesses would presumably
be happy to have MITI, which is primarily concerned with the interests of businesses,
engaged more directly in the policy-making process of competition policy.
R2: between businesses and politicians
Japanese politicians need a lot of money to be elected, which, to a larger extent, can be
explained by the tendency of person-based, and not party-based, voting
17. Whereas this
has not changed over time, two important changes occurred in relation to political
finance in the 1990s. Firstly, Keizai dantai rengokai (the Federation of Economic
Organizations in Japan, Keidanren) stopped playing an intermediary role between
businesses and political parties with regard to political finance in 1993. Formerly,
Keidanren had drawn political donations from trade associations and collectively
provided them for LDP (and to a less extent, the Democratic Socialist Party). However,
Keidanren abandoned this system in 1993, partly due to strong public criticism of
political corruption after some large-scale bribery cases around 1990, and partly because
Keidanren became less confident of the exclusive connection with LDP, as the one-party
dominance of that party since 1955 was broken under the political upheaval at that time.
                                                
17 As for the political finance in Japan, see, for example, Iwai, T. (1990) “Seiji-sikin” no Kenkyu (The
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Paradoxically, the discontinuance of the unitary financial supply from Keidanren to
LDP has led to an increase in the bargaining power of businesses vis-à-vis LDP
politicians. After all, politicians have to seek alternative financial sources now from
individual sponsors. Since the tendency of large payment for the electoral victory has
not changed at all, politicians must anyhow find their individual sponsors. Under those
circumstances, it is not surprising that they tend to get more sensitive to the demands of
their sponsors. On top of that, the current “demands” tend to be more focused, since the
sponsors are no longer the whole industry, but rather individual firms or sectors.
Although the Political Fund Rectification Law was reinforced so as to block unduly
partial donations and to open relevant information to the public, there are still a number
of loopholes in that law. For instance, politicians often collect donations by means of
selling party tickets. While the law provides that a company cannot normally give more
than 50,000 yen without opening its name, the upper limit is raised to 200,000 yen if the
money is concerned with the payment for attending a party (lunch, dinner or whatever).
On top of that, when a company wants to pay more than 200,000 yen without giving out
its name, it can ask its workers to make an individual payment - there is no restriction as
to how many workers can do that.
The second important change in the Japanese political system is the electoral reform,
which introduced the small, or single-member, constituency system to the election for
the House of Representatives. This has increased the financial demand of politicians
tremendously, which naturally gives additional bargaining power to businesses as the
providers of political finance. It is theoretically true that the election of one person in
one constituency under the new system can turn the person-based voting into the party-  16
based voting to avoid conflicts between candidates of the same party in one district, so
that the expenditures can be reduced. In practice, however, political finance in general
allegedly rose in the 1996 election (the first election after the reform), because the
candidates needed more votes to win in their constituency, and to get that, they tended to
spend more money than before
18.
Apart from the changes in political finance, we should also note that the recent
changes in the party structure seem to provide businesses with more influence over
competition policy. Until the 1980s, each political party held a rather clear idea on
competition policy. LDP, following the claim of businesses, tended to marginalize
competition policy while other “progressive” parties often unitedly opposed it. For the
latter, competition policy was one of the clear symbols of economic democratization,
and it was easy for them to come to an agreement on that issue. However, the political
change in the 1990s has totally changed this structure. While LDP regained its
governmental position just two years after its defeat in 1993, the Socialist Party, which
had formally been regarded as the leader of the “progressive” parties, rapidly lost its
popularity - it reduced its seats in the House of Representatives from 136 in 1990 to 14
in 1998. It is true that another party (the Democratic Party) emerged and tried to take
leadership, but it has become more difficult for non-LDP parties to make strong
alliance. After all, the Democratic Party itself encompasses many former-LDP
politicians as well as former “progressives”, and the attitude of the whole party seems
                                                
18 For example, one candidate complained in the 1996 election that he needs nearly twice as much money
as before, because he had to ‘catch’ more voters to win the election. See Mainichi Shimbun, 2 October
1996  17
quite ambiguous in many political issues including competition policy. Consequently,
LDP is now less likely to encounter strong opposition when it carries out the demands
of businesses in relation to competition policy. In other words, businesses are now able
to control LDP politicians more effectively, at least when it comes to competition
policy.
R3: between FTC and businesses
It is true that FTC does not have such a significant “descent from heaven” system as
other ministries, and one may see that businesses are less likely to put pressure on FTC
in that way. Still, there is a suspicion about a cozy relationship between FTC and
businesses through Koseitorihiki Kyokai (the Fair Trade Association), a public
corporation largely sponsored by big businesses. Through this association, FTC officials
often have regular meetings with businesses which are not open to the public. Also,
Koseitorihiki Kyokai provides some executive posts for those who retired from FTC. As
a matter of course, it is not automatically evil for businesses and FTC to exchange their
ideas, nor is it unnatural for those specialized in competition policy to work for the
FTA. Yet it should be remembered that such a relationship often leads to the suspicion
of FTC’s vulnerability to the pressure of businesses
19.
                                                
19 In 1994, for instance, a group of ‘discount’ retailers, which primarily fought against cosmetics
producers insisting the preservation of resale price maintenance at that time, made a ‘public inquiry’ about
the relationship between FTC and Koseitorihiki Kyokai, believing that the apparent reluctance of FTC to
beat resale price maintenance came from the collusion through that corporation. See, for example, Shukan
Toyo Keizai, 4 June 1994, pp.40-43  18
R4: between FTC and other ministries
In the Japanese administrative system, FTC belongs to the Prime Minister’s Office
(PMO) with a status of “independent administrative commission”. This means that FTC,
unlike its counterparts in such countries as Britain and Sweden, does not belong to any
other ministry concerned with industrial policy or policy for particular sectors, such as
MITI and MoF. Since PMO is not generally in a position to supervise industrial policy,
it is not normally interested in, nor capable of, managing competition policy. Thus, FTC
has often been allowed to speak out on the design of competition policy, whilst other
ministries have no formal power to prevent it. Moreover, the Chairman of FTC can stay
in his office for five years unless he reaches the retirement age, and nobody can dismiss
him in opposition to his will. He holds much independence in this sense.
When we look at FTC’s personnel system, nonetheless, we realize that it is not
presumably be regarded as totally independent from the pressure of other public
officials. Although Article 29 of AML provides that the Chairman and the
Commissioners should be “academics”, this rule has largely been neglected so far. It is
true that one of four Commissioner posts has been occupied by those from FTC
Secretariat, who can possibly be treated as “academics” in this context, but all other
posts were occupied by officials from other ministries, including MoF, the Ministry of
Justice, the Public Prosecution Office (PPO), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and MITI.
This post-distribution system is almost formalized and ‘the ministries see the post in
FTC just as one of the destinations for the “descent from heaven”’
20, which was
commented in the 1960s, but has not changed considerably since then, despite SII.  19
As for the Chairman’s position, for instance, it had long been occupied by public
officials from MoF. There have been fifteen Chairmen so far, and nine of them have
come from MoF. From 1963 to 1995, the post had been occupied by those either from
MoF or from the Bank of Japan, which also bears a close relationship with MoF and the
banking sector.
It is true that the current Chairman, Yasuchika Negoro (1996-), came from PPO and
that he has a legal qualification, and it is widely known that his appointment resulted
from strong public criticism about the long-time ‘occupation’ of MoF in the post of FTC
Chairman, against the background of consecutive revelations of the scandals related to
that ministry. Yet it may be misleading to think that MoF now has given up the control
over FTC. Negoro was hired as a consultant by a private company thanks to the pressure
of the National Tax Administration Agency, which is connected not only to PPO, but
also to MoF. It should also be noted that he is widely known as ‘political’, particularly
in the sense that he allegedly has a close relationship with Seiroku Kajiyama, one of the
influential figures in LDP.
Of course, it may not be important where the Chairman and the Commissioners come
from, but for several reasons, it should not be ignored. Firstly, criticism has often come
out against “layman commissioners”. The personnel system of the Japanese government
is based on the “generalist model”, whereby public officials are expected to work well in
general, but not being “specialists”. Whether such a model is good or not for the
Japanese administrative system, it appears problematic to incorporate the recruitment
system of FTC Chairmen/ Commissioners into that system, despite that their academic
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professionalism is clearly required by AML.
Secondly, it is possible for the ministries to exert some influence by appointing those
that are loyal to them. They have naturally become more cautious about their choice of
appointees, as competition policy has increased its importance. For this reason, we are
less likely to see the advent of so courageous Chairmen/ Commissioners as Mr.
Toshihide Takahashi in the mid-1970s, who devoted himself to the reinforcement of
AML, despite strong opposition of businesses.
In recent years, the influence of MoF has particularly been salient. The rise in the
concern about competition policy after SII may well have increased their interest in
keeping their position within FTC. We cannot ignore such a comment that ‘we need an
administrative body which supervise not only the financial sector but also all other
sectors in order to implement balanced economic policy’
21, which was made by a former
administrative vice-minister of MoF. According to Ikuta, MoF officials are seconded
even to the posts at lower levels, that is, those in FTC Secretariat, at least up to the mid-
1990s:
how can FTC act independently, when it is said to be under the control of the Ministry of Finance?
The Ministry of Finance has sent more than ten officials to work in FTC, including ... four
incumbent career finance officials who occupied the deputy minister and planning section chief
positions. Although FTC has hired approximately forty officials from other agencies, Ministry of
Finance officials have the largest representation by far.
22
                                                
21 See Zaikai, 9 April 1996, pp.50-51
22 Ikuta, op.cit., pp.168-9  21
Under those circumstances, FTC has been quite reluctant to intervene in matters of
which MoF officials would be nervous. It is true that FTC investigated security
companies in 1991, but FTC had not touched upon the financial sector for the previous
thirty years. It is widely suspected that the investigation was carried out with the
approval of MoF, who thought it was better that FTC would take some action in order to
avoid stimulating foreign critics. Moreover, the following statement with regard to the
merger between Toho Sogo Bank and Iyo Bank may well make us wonder if FTC is the
independent administrative commission whose primary concern is competition policy or
a branch of MoF, who preferred the preservation of all existing banks at that time:
... In this case, FTC judged that the merger would not substantially limit competition immediately
in particular trade areas, given that the increase in the market share is generally small, that it is
difficult to find an adequate bank other than Iyo Bank to absorb Toho Sogo Bank in order to avoid
its bankruptcy, and that some branches are planned to be transferred to other banks where the
market share is increased to a large extent, even if the market share in terms of deposit and loan is
29.6% and 41.3% respectively in Ehime prefecture.
23
The reluctance of FTC to defy MoF was also shown when it dealt with holding
companies. FTC gave up its own control over holding companies related to financial
sectors from the beginning. Indeed, an FTC official told the author that ‘financial
holding companies are put under the authority of MoF, and we do not touch upon it’
24.
                                                
23 FTC, Koseitorihikiiinkai Nenjihokoku (Annual Report of FTC) 1991
24 Quoted from the author’s interview on 12 January 1998. A similar comment is shown in Foresight,
December 1997, p.99  22
Besides the influence of MoF, there is a persistent question about the ability of FTC
officials, when considering their negotiation power vis-à-vis other public officials in the
government. As Ikuta notes
25, whereas ‘many believe that FTC career officials hired
during and after the early 1970s are of a higher caliber than their predecessors’, ‘it is a
common belief among bureaucrats that a huge “ability gap” exists between FTC
officials and their counterparts at other agencies’, both because ‘the majority were
considered mediocre’ by the standard of Japanese bureaucracy in terms of the record on
the Level I Examination for the National Civil Service, and because ‘many could reach,
without contest, a rank equivalent to director-general’ thanks to the small scale of
recruitment. It must be added here that FTC has a particular group of Hokkaido
University graduates in its mainstream
26, which is quite different from other ministries
in which the graduates from Tokyo University take the initiative. Supposedly, this
makes FTC officials marginalized regardless of their real competence, given the
academic snobbism of Japanese bureaucrats. Against this background, FTC may often
find it difficult to counter the pressure from other ministries properly.
R5: between FTC and politicians
It is not surprising that the above “ability gap” makes politicians high-handed toward
FTC, while they often entrust such ministries as MITI and MoF. On top of that, the
formal status of an independent administrative commission is seen as disadvantageous
                                                
25 Ikuta, op.cit., pp.166-167 and p.171
26 This is pointed out by Professor Atsuya, who currently works for Hokkaido University and was
formerly the Head of FTC Secretariat Bureau (1988-1990) in Interview on 23 January 1998  23
to FTC. The independence of FTC might lead to the failure to find its alliance in the
‘community’ of Japanese bureaucrats, as Misonou pointed out
27. Since FTC is a tiny
agency whatever its formal legal position is, it is very difficult to withstand adverse
political pressure just by itself. Whereas the concentration of power in one body can be
quite advantageous to avoid complexity, the organizational singleness may increase the
vulnerability to external pressure. Without any mutual checking system like the one
between the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice in the US,
nobody could rectify the direction of FTC once it had yielded to such external pressure,
as frequently shown in the history of FTC in reality. Although the American model is
not recommended here, some consideration could be given to the organizational
plurality and mutual checking system in this kind of policy area.
In relation to this, we should also take into account the decision-making structure
within FTC. According to AML, the Chairman does not have any formal decision-
making power, since his vote is considered as just one out of five votes within FTC, and
other commissioners are not regarded as the subordinates of the chairman, but as his
colleagues. Nonetheless, as Otake points out, ‘since the functions of individual
Commissioners is not differentiated, nor are they placed at particular divisions of the
Secretariat, the Chairman holds an almost exclusive channel of communication with the
Secretariat and with external parties, and this had in substance made the Commissioners
subject to the control of the Chairman’
28. Of course, the existence of strong leadership
                                                
27 Misonou, H. (1987) Nihon no Dokusenkinshi Seisaku to Sangyo Soshiki (The Anti-Monopoly Policy
and Industrial Structure in Japan), p.30
28 Otake (1996) Gendai Nihon no Seiji Kenryoku Keizai Kenryoku (The Political and Economic Power in  24
can be a merit when the Chairman has so much vigor and enthusiasm. Otherwise,
however, the “stand-off” of the Chairman may increase FTC’s vulnerability so that one
single person is exposed to political pressure. On this point, we should remember the
case of collusive tendering among construction firms in 1992, where Setsuo Umezawa,
the chairman of FTC, was suspected to have given up a formal accusation yielding to
political pressure from Kishiro Nakamura, the Minister of Construction at that time.
With regard to the relationship between FTC and politicians, furthermore, it should
also be noted that there is no ‘Competition Policy Minister’ under the current
framework. Such a minister would protect FTC from the pressure of politicians
concerned about other political purposes. It is true that the establishment of such a
ministerial position allows direct political interference into the decision-making process
of FTC, but we should not forget that the successive FTC Chairmen have already
suffered from political pressure from anywhere. In relation to this, it should also be
pointed out that there is no remarkable “Competition Policy Zoku” either in LDP or in
other parties. As politicians with similar interests (or with support from similar interest
groups) often join together under the same group labeled “Zoku”, which means “family”
or “tribe” in Japanese. While it has developed in many other policy areas, that is not the
case in competition policy, and the lack of such support group of politicians seems to
increase the vulnerability of FTC to other political interests. Although most politicians
argue that ‘competition policy is important’ nowadays, they do not appear so serious as
to give special support to FTC at the cost of other interests.
                                                                                                                                              
Modern Japan), pp.313-314  25
5. Conclusion
There is little doubt that “international harmonization” of competition policy provides a
fundamental condition for the internationalization of the Japanese market, which is one
of the key factors for the revival of Japanese economy, and the recent development of
Japanese competition policy appears to be promising in that sense, although we should
remember that it includes some negative aspects as revealed earlier.
Yet we should not finish our discussion just at that level. In this paper, we have
observed that the bargaining power of businesses toward public officials and politicians
appears to have grown in general, and that FTC remains vulnerable to external pressure
even after SII. Taking those elements into consideration, we should be more cautious
about the recent direction of the reform of competition policy. This is not to say,
however, that the recent changes, notably the removal of holding company prohibition
and the relaxation of merger control, were inherently evil.
Instead, a more serious problem of Japanese competition policy is that the current
policy-making system does not provide any significant counterforce to businesses, and
that the interests of businesses tend to be over-represented. This may be quite
disadvantageous to the Japanese economy, given that the current depression comes, at
least partly, from structural defects including collusive behavior and anti-competitive
practices of Japanese businesses. While it is clear that those defects should be rectified
by reinforcing competition policy, it may be natural that businesses rarely become
courageous enough to support it policy when they encounter serious economic
difficulties, even though they come to understand the importance of market competition.
Needless to say, this problem cannot be solved only by focusing on the apparent changes  26
in legal texts or enforcement level.
There is no doubt that the discussion about “international harmonization” is
significant, but it should not overshadow the importance of national policy-making
structure. After all, the post-war history of Japanese competition policy has by itself
shown us that it is very difficult to achieve substantial changes only by introducing
formal legal framework.  27
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